Wednesday, January 28, 2015

Rick Santorum Is An Article II Natural Born Citizen and Eligible to Be President









Rick Santorum Is An Article II Natural Born Citizen and Eligible to Be President

By Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
January 28, 2015


  










Rick Santorum will be a presidential candidate in 2016.  As we know, the President and Commander in Chief of the Military must be, among other things (at least 35 years old and a resident in the United States at least 14 years), an Article II “natural born Citizen” in order to be eligible for that Office.  There has been some chatter that Rick Santorum is not a natural born citizen and therefore not eligible to be President.  My research shows the contrary, i.e., that Rick Santorum is a natural born citizen and therefore eligible to be President and Commander in Chief of the Military. 

The one and only definition of a natural born citizen the Framers used when they adopted the Constitution is the universal one which is a child born in a country to parents who were its citizens at the time of the child's birth, meaning, when applied to the United States, a child born in the United States to parents who were both U.S. citizens at the time of the child's birth. See Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Section 212 (1758) (1797) ) (“The natives, or natural-born citizens, are those born in the country, of parents who are citizens”); Minor v. Happersett (1875) (“‘At common law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children, born in a country, of parents who were its citizens, became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives, or  [902]  natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners”); U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark (1898) (distinguished a "natural born citizen" as so originally defined by the common law at the time of the adoption of the Constitution per Minor from a "citizen" at birth under the Fourteenth Amendment which was ratified 81 years after the adoption of the Constitution).  Does Rick Santorum meet the Framers’ common law definition of an Article II natural born citizen”  My research shows that he does. 

Rick Santorum was born on May 10, 1958 in Virginia.  "Rick Santorum is the middle of the three children of Aldo Santorum (1923–2011), a clinical psychologist who immigrated to the United States at age seven from Riva del Garda, Italy, and Catherine (Dughi) Santorum (b. 1918), an administrative nurse who is of Italian and Irish ancestry.[8]  Santorum was born in Winchester, Virginia, and grew up in Berkeley County, West Virginia, and Butler County, Pennsylvania.”  (footnotes omitted). http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rick_Santorum . Aldo Santorum (Rick Santorum’s father, who was born on January 9, 1923 in Italy) was the son of Pietro Santorum (Rick Santorum’s grandfather).  Pietro, an Italian citizen, came to America on November 20, 1923, and naturalized to become a citizen of the United States on April 14, 1930.  See the research done by Commander Charles F. Kerchner at https://www.scribd.com/doc/86126538/Pietro-Santorum-Naturalization-Records-filed-1930-at-Somerset-County-PA-Courthouse  When Pietro became a citizen of the United States, Aldo was a minor and still living in Italy.  Aldo got derivative U.S. citizenship through his father, Pietro, when Aldo arrived in the United States on August 23, 1930 when he was age 7.  

Aldo Santorum automatically become a citizen on August 23, 1930 through the naturalization of his father which had already occurred on April 14, 1930.  This type of citizenship is called derivative citizenship.  But since he was neither born in the United States nor naturalized in the formal sense after his birth, he did not have any evidence that he was a U.S. citizen.  So, on April 17, 1961, he filed for a Certificate of Citizenship, not to obtain citizenship which he already had since 1930, but only to obtain evidence of that citizenship.  His application and related documents have also been obtained by Mr. Kerchner and can be viewed here: http://www.scribd.com/doc/108907280/100-Proof-Rick-Santorum-Born-a-Dual-Citizen-Not-a-Natural-Born-Citizen-Father-perfected-naturalization-3-yrs-after-Rick-was-born-FOIA-Response-R .  These documents show that Aldo served in the U.S. military from 1944 to 1946. The Immigration and Naturalization Officer who reviewed his application recommended that his Certificate of Citizenship be granted, concluding:

"[T]he applicant did derive or acquire United States citizenship on August 23, 1930 through on which date he was a lawful permanent resident of the United States and under the age of 21 years, his father having been naturalized on April 14, 1930, his mother being an alien. and that he has not been expatriated since that time."

Rick was not yet born when Pietro and Aldo became U.S. citizens in 1930.  Aldo married Catherine (Dughi) Santorum, who was a  U.S. citizen.   Hence, when Rick Santorum was born on May 10, 1958, to Aldo and Catherine, both his parents were U.S. citizens. 

We have seen that both de facto President Barack Obama and Senator Ted Cruz, both not born in the United States to parents who were both U.S. citizens at the time of their son’s birth, do not satisfy the constitutional common law definition of a natural born citizen.  See my many articles on this issue at my blog, http://puzo1.blogspot.com .  On the other hand, my research shows that when Rick Santorum was born in Virginia in 1958, he was born to a father and mother who were both citizens of the United States.  Those birth circumstances make Rick Santorum an Article II natural born citizen and eligible to be President and Commander in Chief of the Military.   

Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
January 28, 2015
http://puzo1.blogspot.com
####

Copyright © 2015
Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
All Rights Reserved 
 


Sunday, January 25, 2015

Attorney Mario Apuzzo on Moretti Underground Radio—Is Senator Ted Cruz a Natural Born Citizen?


Attorney Mario Apuzzo on Moretti Underground Radio—Is Senator Ted Cruz a Natural Born Citizen?


January 25, 2015
By Mario Apuzzo, Esq.

On Monday, January 26, 2015, at 9:00 PM Eastern Standard Time, I will be a guest of Hosts Jo Anne Moretti and Scott Farrarello on the radio show, Moretti Underground, broadcast on the PRN Radio Network – Patriot Radio.  The topic of discussion will be whether Senator Ted Cruz is an Article II natural born citizen.  Based on my research, it is my opinion that Senator Cruz, like de facto President Barack Obama, is not an Article II natural born citizen and therefore not eligible to be President and Commander in Chief of the Military.  During the show, I will be discussing my research and opinion which I have drawn from that research. 
 
I hope that you can join Jo Anne, Scott, and me and call in with your questions. 

You can also access the custom web site chatroom at www.PRNRadioNetwork.com


The show can be accessed at http://www.blogtalkradio.com/prnradionetwork .  The call in telephone number is (714) 888-7404.  

Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
January 25, 2015
http://puzo1.blogspot.com
####


Copyright © 2015
Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
All Rights Reserved 
     

Friday, July 19, 2013

The Constitution, the Rule of Law, and the “Natural Born Citizen” Clause: A Response to Artsy Fartsy Squeeky Fromm Girl Reporter







The Constitution, the Rule of Law, and the “Natural Born Citizen” Clause:  A Response to Artsy Fartsy Squeeky Fromm Girl Reporter

By Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
July 19, 2013











Artsy Fartsy Squeeky Fromm Girl Reporter (“Squeeky Fromm”) continues in vain to try to persuade the public that she has refuted my position that an Article II “natural born Citizen” is a child born in the country to parents who were its “citizens” at the time of the child’s birth. 

I.                 
   
Squeeky Fromm has taken a stab at my Jack Maskell article, The Fallacies of Congressional Legislative Attorney Jack Maskell’s Definition of a “Natural Born Citizen,”  accessed at http://puzo1.blogspot.com/2013/06/the-fallacies-of-congressional.htmlYou can read her response here. http://birtherthinktank.wordpress.com/2013/06/08/he-says-apuzzo-i-say-a-pazzo/

She says that I have misread
Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875), because the Court said that “new citizens may be born or they may be created by naturalization.” I say, so what in light of the fact that the Court also said: “At common-law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners.”  Id. at 167-68.  Hence, the Court said that at common law, if one was not born in the country to citizen parents, one was an “alien or foreigner.” This is the same exact treatment that Congress gave to children born in the United States to alien parents in its Naturalization Acts of 1790, 1795, 1802, and 1855. In these acts, Congress treated children born in the United States to alien parents as alien born and in need of naturalization.  So Squeeky Fromm has proven nothing other than to show that she does not understand what she reads.

Then Squeeky Fromm turns to my logical analysis of the Maskell fallacious argument. In the first part of her attempt at logic, it is quite clear that she has totally missed my point about Maskell’s first argument being invalid. I showed that Maskell’s first argument as having this invalid logical form (“natural born Citizen”=NBC; “citizen at birth”=CAB):

All NBCs are CABs.
All X’s are CABs.
Therefore, all X’s are NBC.

To show the invalidity of this argument, I wrote:

All poodles are dogs.
Bubbles is a dog.
Therefore, Bubbles is a poodle.

Squeeky Fromm says that this argument is not valid and faults me for presenting it. She misstates my presentation, even attempting to prove me wrong by showing through some other irrelevant logical argument why this argument is not valid. I said that this is the argument presented by Maskell.  But I said that this is Maskell’s argument and that it is not valid because it violates the rule of the undistributed middle and is also fallacious for affirming the consequent. So, what is ironic is that Squeeky Fromm attacks me, in her twisted and incorrect way, for the argument when what she is really doing is attacking Jack Maskell.

Then Squeeky Fromm takes a shot at the second part of my analysis of the Maskell argument.  I recast his argument as follows to make the argument valid: 

All CAB’s are NBCs.
All X’s are CAB’s.
Therefore, all X’s are NBCs.

In my article, I explained that I took Maskell’s invalid argument (above) and made it valid through this logical form. I did this to show where Maskell’s informal fallacy is hidden. I showed how this argument is logically valid, but unsound because its major premise, All CAB’s are NBCs, is false. I explained that Maskell has not presented any evidence to prove the truth of this major premise. I presented U.S. Supreme Court case law which addressed the meaning of a “natural-born citizen” and this case law does not support Maskell’s thesis that all “citizens at birth” are “natural-born citizens.” See below for a summary of these cases.  And even though Squeeky Fromm comes to Maskell’s aid, she also does not present any evidence to show that Maskell’s major premise, as reconstructed by me, would be true. What she does in place of presenting any evidence that the major premise is true is just to say that the premise does not strike her “as being facially incorrect, invalid, or untrue.” From this statement we can see that Squeeky Fromm has very little understanding of informal logic and fallacies. An informal fallacy has the exact facial appeal that she relies upon. But when its underlying truth is tested, it fails.

I have demonstrated how Maskell has not proven that his major premise is true. I have also presented evidence that shows that his major premise is false. I have therefore unmasked the informal fallacy of the Maskell major premise, i.e., that all “citizens at birth” are “natural born Citizens.” Yet, Squeeky Fromm says that I have proven nothing. On the contrary, she is the one who just says a lot of mixed up nothing, demonstrates how incapable she is of understanding case law, and proves how ignorant she is when it comes to logic.
II.                 
In her June 12, 2013 “Distributed Muddle” article, accessed at http://birtherthinktank.wordpress.com/2013/06/12/mario-apuzzo-esq-s-distributed-muddle/ ,
Squeeky Fromm tries to persuade that she successfully addressed my criticisms of Congressional Attorney Jack Maskell’s thesis (his major premise) that all born citizens are “natural born citizens.”  From her article we can see that she is starting to understand the world of logic a little better. But she does not admit the blunder that she made with the first part of my logical presentation in which I expose why to argue, that since all “natural born Citizen” are “citizens at birth,” and since Barack Obama is a “citizen at birth,” he is a “natural born Citizen,” is logically invalid.  We have to recognize this argument and show that it is invalid because it is one of the means by which Maskell arrives at his conclusion that Obama is a “natural born citizen.”   

Second, Squeeky Fromm, underplays the second part of my logical analysis where I show, by converting Maskell’s invalid argument into a valid argument, that Maskell’s second argument is unsound because the major premises is false.  Maskell’s second argument can only be all “citizens at birth” are “natural born citizens,” and since Obama is a “citizen at birth,” he is a “natural born citizen.”  Maskell’s major premise in this argument would be all “citizens at birth” are “natural born Citizens.” Squeeky Fromm fails to understand the importance of the maneuver of taking someone’s invalid argument and making valid. It is done to show that if the argument is to succeed, then its premises must be true. And it is here that I have shown that Maskell’s major premise is false and therefore also his conclusion that Obama is a “natural born citizen.”    

Squeeky Fromm just blows this point off by simply saying that there is just a disagreement between Maskell and me on the definition of a “natural born Citizen.” Now is that not just genius for Squeeky Fromm to figure out. I have challenged both Maskell and Squeeky Fromm to provide evidence that Maskell’s major premise is true. We do not hear from Maskell nor do we expect to.  And from Squeeky Fromm, who loves to make herself heard on a daily basis, she simply says that
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) trumps Minor. So there you have the strength of their argument which is supposed to prove that Maskell’s major premise is true. We know that Minor defined a “natural-born citizen” as a child born in the country to parents who were its citizens at the time of the child’s birth. And we also know that Wong Kim Ark, interpreting the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and its “subject to the jurisdiction” clause, and ultimately defining a “citizen of the United States” at birth under that amendment, did not alter Minor’s definition of a “natural-born citizen,” and even distinguished a “natural-born citizen” from a “citizen of the United States” at birth under that amendment.  Squeeky Fromm is just making stuff up given that she has nothing else to present to us which would show that the Maskell major premises is true. 

So, Maskell’s first argument, that since Obama is a “citizen at birth” he is a “natural born Citizen” is not valid. And his second argument which necessarily contains the major premise, all “citizens at birth” are “natural born Citizens,” has no historical and legal support. Hence, Maskell’s argument, no matter which one we choose as to what is a “natural born Citizen” and whether Obama meets that definition, is false. 

III.              

Squeeky Fromm also comes to the aid of Ted Cruz in her June 25, 2013 article published at http://birtherthinktank.wordpress.com/2013/06/25/with-2020-foresight-the-once-and-future-apuzzo/ In this piece, which she passes off as a decision against me rendered by an imaginary judge, she argues, albeit without any historical or legal support, that my definition of a “natural born citizen,” i.e., a child born in the country to parents who were its “citizens” at the time of the child’s birth is wrong.  She maintains that Cruz, who was born in Canada to a non-U.S. “citizen” father and a U.S. “citizen” mother is a “natural born citizen.” 

She attempts to dismiss Minor as being irrelevant to the issue of both Obama and Cruz’s eligibility, arguing that Minor did not define or deal with children born inside the United States to alien parents. This is incorrect. Minor told us that at common law with which the Framers were familiar, such children were “aliens or foreigners.” Here is the quote from the Court:  “At common-law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners.”  We can see from what the Court said that at common law if a child was born in the United States to alien parents, the child was an “alien or foreigner.”  It also follows from this common law rule that at common law (not to be confounded with statutes), any child who was born out of the United States, regardless of whether born to “citizen” parents or alien parents, was also an alien or foreigner.  This common law rule was reflected in Congress’s Naturalization Acts of 1790, 1795, 1802, and 1855 which treated children born in the United States to alien parents as alien born and naturalized at birth children born out of the United States to “citizen” parents or naturalized them after birth if born to alien parents.  

She states that the clause “natural born citizen” “was discussed at length in U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark.” This is false. Wong Kim Ark discussed at length the English common law and an English “natural born subject.” The English common law defined neither a “citizen” nor a “natural born citizen.”  Justice Swayne in United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785 (Cir.Ct. D. Ky. 1866) (No. 16,151), told us that neither a “citizen” nor a “natural born citizen” were defined by the English common law. The court said that “British jurisprudence, whence so much of our own is drawn, throws little light upon the subject.  . . . Blackstone and Tomlin contain nothing upon the subject. ”  Id. at 788.  So, Wong Kim Ark, which spent much time on analyzing the English common law, could not have been analyzing the meaning of a “natural born citizen” which clause was not even found in that law. 

Squeeky Fromm quotes Wong Kim Ark’s comment that the English common law jus soli rule continued “to prevail under the Constitution as originally established.” This statement does not prove that a “natural born citizen” was defined under English common law and not under the law of nations. What this statement means is that through the time of the adoption of the Constitution, the states, which selectively adopted the English common law until abrogated by state legislatures, decided who their citizens were and that they to some undefined degree used the jus soli English common law rule to make that decision. These state citizens became “citizens of the United States” upon the adoption of the Constitution. But then in 1790, Congress passed the Naturalization Act of 1790, followed by that of 1795, 1802, and 1855. After that, the states, to whatever degree they still applied the English common law, could no longer naturalize anyone after birth and their state citizens were no longer recognized as national citizens or what the Constitution called “citizens of the United States.” The only common law rule that Congress did not nor could abrogate was that of the law of nations/American national common law which the Founders, Framers, and Ratifiers used to certainly and uniformly define a “natural born citizen.” And that definition was a child born in a country to parents who were its “citizens” at the time of the child’s birth.

Squeeky Fromm repeats that “citizens at birth” are equivalent to “natural born citizens.”  But like Jack Maskell, she begs the question that all “citizens at birth” are “natural born citizens.” Other than just assuming, like Jack Maskell, that her statement is true, she fails to provide any evidence that her statement is true. Hence, that the Fourteenth Amendment or a Congressional Act might declare someone born either in the United States or out of it to be a “citizen at birth” does not prove that that person is a “natural born citizen.”

She argues that Ted Cruz is a “natural born citizen” under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1401(g).  Here, she makes the absurd argument that Cruz is a “natural born citizen” by way of a naturalization act of Congress.  Using her logic, the “natural born citizen” clause would have no meaning or limits if Congress could simply naturalize anyone at birth which Squeeky Fromm then considers to be a “natural born citizen.”  She looks to the Naturalization Act of 1790 for support. Regarding whether children born out of the United States to U.S. “citizen” parents are “natural-born citizens,” the Naturalization Act of 1790 does not help Squeeky Fromm because the 1795 Act, with the work of James Madison, repealed it and replaced “natural born citizen” with “citizen of the United States.” Despite her statement that Congress never did so, the 1795 Act, with James Madison’s influence, plainly shows from its text that “Congress intended to limit the rights of foreign born citizens at birth to some quanta less than that of a natural born citizen.” Furthermore, Wong Kim Ark informed us that the Fourteenth Amendment “has not touched the acquisition of citizenship by being born abroad of American parents, and has left that subject to be regulated, as it had always been, by Congress in the exercise of the power conferred by the Constitution to establish an uniform rule of naturalization.” So, Wong Kim Ark told us that children born out of the United States to U.S. “citizen” parents become “citizens at birth” under Congress’s naturalization powers. That means they are naturalized at birth. By her own concession, if they are naturalized, they cannot be “natural born citizens,” regardless of when they obtain their citizenship.

Squeeky Fromm puts forth a straw man argument, arguing that it is an injustice that the children born abroad to our military should be denied the status of “natural born citizens.”  But she misstates my position on that issue.  I have always argued, under Vattel’s Section 217, a child born out of the United States to U.S. “citizen” parents serving the defense of the United States (“the armies of the state”) is reputed born in the United States and therefore a “natural born citizen.” This rule makes John McCain, who was born to U.S. “citizen” parents serving the U.S. national defense, a “natural born citizen” regardless of where in Panama he may have been born.

Squeeky Fromm argues that my position that if Congress makes one a “citizen” at birth, then Congress naturalized that person to be a “citizen” at birth is absurd because Congress in 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1401(a) passed a statute which also acts upon the “natural born citizens.”  But that Congress may choose to pass a statute acting upon “natural born citizens” does not make those persons naturalized citizens.  Those persons are “natural born citizen” and they do not lose that status because Congress may pass a naturalization statute which also acts upon them. 

Squeeky Fromm engages in an invalid logical argument, arguing: All "natural born citizens" are "citizens at birth," and since Ted Cruz is a "citizen at birth," he is a "natural born Citizen." As I have shown above, this argument violates the rule of the undistributed middle. It is also fallacious for affirming the consequent. As I have already explained, Jack Maskell commits the same logical errors.  She also commits logical error when she argues: All “natural born citizens are not naturalized citizens. Since Ted Cruz is not a naturalized citizen, he is a “natural born citizen.” She does not understand that we cannot arrive at an affirmative conclusion by way of one or two negative premises. 

Squeeky Fromm argues that “natural born citizens” are not naturalized citizens. Citizens “may be born or they may be created by naturalization.”  She adds that Cruz is a “born citizen” and not a naturalized citizen. She concludes that since he is “born a citizen” and not naturalized, he must be a “natural born citizen.”  Her argument fails because she does not account for how “born citizens” are made. “Born citizens” may be made by American national common law, by the Fourteenth Amendment, or by Acts of Congress. Per Minor, only the ones made by American national common law are “natural-born citizens.” Those made by the Fourteenth Amendment and Acts of Congress are “citizens of the United States” at birth. So, as we can see, just being a “born citizen” or “citizen at birth” does not automatically make one a “natural born citizen.”

Squeeky Fromm’s argument that since parentage is irrelevant for “citizens at birth” under the Fourteenth Amendment, therefore it must also be irrelevant for “natural born citizens” fails for at least two reasons. First, as I have shown above, there are different types of “citizens at birth,” and that parentage might not be relevant to one type does not mean it is not relevant to another type (which is the “natural born citizen” type). 


Squeeky Fromm begs the question that the Fourteenth Amendment defines a “natural born citizen.” She may say it, but she does not prove it. Actually, the Fourteenth Amendment is a red herring when it comes to defining a “natural born citizen.”  Why do I say that the Fourteenth Amendment is a red herring when it comes to defining an Article II “natural born Citizen?”  People like Squeeky Fromm love to use the Fourteenth Amendment as support in the “natural born Citizen” debate.  The amendment provides them with a moral argument for their definition of a “natural born Citizen” which has a great appeal with the American public.   That moral appeal is based on the history and purpose of the amendment.  We cannot forget that Congress passed the amendment as part of its Reconstruction after the Civil War.  It was to guarantee, among various things, the freed slaves citizenship through birth in the United States.  The amendment was designed to put an end for good to the Dred Scott decision, which had denied freed blacks the right to U.S. citizenship.  The amendment made sure that no state could abridge the privileges and immunities enjoyed by “citizens of the United States.”  The amendment also introduced the concept of due process as the protector of life, liberty, and property from abusive state action (the Fifth Amendment prohibits the federal government from depriving one of due process), and obligated the states to extend equal protection of the laws to any person present within its jurisdiction.  The Amendment came to be used as a primary tool to combat racism and discrimination, not only against blacks, but all people who suffered such illegal activities at the hands of any state.  So the amendment is not only connected to citizenship, but it is also supposed to protect our freedom and secure many rights of the individual.  With all that, the amendment packs a strong emotional punch.  So, people like Squeeky Fromm have found a great friend in the Fourteenth Amendment in their attempt to convince people that the amendment defines a “natural born citizen.” 

The problem for Squeeky Fromm is that while the amendment defines two classes of citizenship, federal and state, and has done great things for protecting life, liberty, and property, and the civil rights of all persons present on American territory, it has nothing to do with defining a “natural born Citizen.”  But that surely does not stop Squeeky Fromm from using the amendment when it comes to providing us with a definition of a “natural born Citizen.”  After all, how could she pass it up after all it has done for the betterment of American society?  So people like Squeeky Fromm will continue to tell the public how could anyone dare believe that a “natural born citizen” is not defined by that amendment which does so much to protect our American way of life. 

But the simple truth is that Squeeky Fromm conflates and confounds a “citizen” under the amendment with an Article II “natural born citizen.”  Anyone who will just stop and read the amendment can readily see that it does not even mention the clause “natural born Citizen.”  Rather, it mentions “citizen of the United States,” which citizenship status Article II, Section 1, Clause 5 tells us is no longer sufficient for one to be eligible to be President today.  If one also looks further into the amendment, one will learn that it neither repealed nor amended Article II’s “natural born Citizen” clause and therefore left that clause to be defined as it had always been defined under American national common law.  And that definition is, as confirmed by the unanimous U.S. Supreme Court in Minor and the majority and dissent in Wong Kim Ark, a child born in the country to parents who were its “citizens” at the time of the child’s birth. 

Squeeky Fromm argues that there is no sign of Emer de Vattel post Wong Kim Ark and therefore Vattel is dead. This is false. Minor’s definition of a “natural-born citizen,” being a paraphrase of Vattel’s
The Law of Nations (London 1797) (1st ed. Neuchatel 1758), comes from Vattel. Wong Kim Ark did not disturb that definition nor did it have to in order to find that Wong was a “citizen of the United States” at birth under the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor has any other decision of the U.S. Supreme Court. Hence, Vattel still lives and reigns after Wong Kim Ark and even to the present.

Squeeky Fromm also fails to understand this fundamental truth--that one becomes at once a “citizen at birth” and does not need naturalization does not mean that one was not naturalized. See Calvin’s Case (1608) which was decided in England in 1608. That case proves that being a “citizen at birth” can entail having been naturalized at birth which necessarily excludes one from being a true “natural born citizen.” Calvin was born to Scottish parents in the country of Scotland, after 1603, the year in which the English throne under the Tudor dynasty descended to the Stuart King, James VI of Scotland, making him James I, King of both England and Scotland. Since Calvin was born after 1603, he was considered a postnati. The English Parliament for political and social reasons refused to naturalize the Scottish Calvin as an English “natural born subject” by statute. Since Parliament would not naturalize him by statute, it was decided by the King’s men that they would get the courts to do so by common law (judge made law). Lord Coke found that under natural law Calvin at birth, having been born in the King’s dominion (Scotland), owed natural allegiance to James as King of England and Scotland, by owing that allegiance to the natural body (as distinguished from his political body and the laws of England that came with it) of the King who reigned over both kingdoms. So because Calvin owed natural allegiance to the natural body of the King and that natural King also ruled over England, Lord Coke found that Calvin also owed allegiance to the King as King of England. So it did not matter that Calvin at birth was not bound by the laws of England. What mattered was that by natural law he was bound by natural allegiance to the King who also ruled over England. Lord Coke then, from the single circumstance of Calvin being born in the King’s dominion, naturalized Calvin at birth vis-a'-vis England and ruled that he was a “natural born subject” of England. Calvin’s Scottish parents (the antenati) were eventually naturalized by statute as English subjects. Calvin’s case proves the fundamental rule that gaining subject status at birth under the English common law rather than a statute does not prove that one is a “natural born citizen,” for that status was gained through judicial naturalization at birth  See also Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Section 214 Naturalisation (1758) (correctly understanding Calvin’s Case said: “Finally, there are states, as, for instance, England, where the single circumstance of being born in the country naturalises the children of a foreigner”); Wong Kim Ark (said that persons who are born abroad to U.S “citizen” parents and who are U.S. citizens at birth are nevertheless so naturalized by Congressional Acts; Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815(1971) (considers persons born abroad to U.S. citizen parents who are citizens at birth to be naturalized at birth; J. Black dissenting in Bellei also said: "All means of obtaining American citizenship which are dependent on congressional enactment are forms of naturalization"). 

IV.         
     
On July 14, 2013, Squeeky Fromm took another jab at my Jack Maskell refutation.  She says: 
“You see the same thing when Mario Apuzzo, Esq. tries to cobble Logical Syllogisms into his Birther legal theories when such techniques are totally inappropriate in situations where the major premises themselves which [sic] are at issue. (See Note 1, below.)

Note 1. For an example of Apuzzo’s sashay into Putative Pedantics, see:http://birtherthinktank.wordpress.com/2013/06/12/mario-apuzzo-esq-s-distributed-muddle/ .”
Squeeky Fromm read my article entitled , The Fallacies of Congressional Legislative Attorney Jack Maskell’s Definition of a “Natural Born Citizen,”  accessed at http://puzo1.blogspot.com/2013/06/the-fallacies-of-congressional.htmlShe learned something about logic from my article.  Now she attempts to use that little bit that she learned to sound authoritative and show that she won the argument.  

I clearly stated the two possible sources for Jack Maskell’s erroneous conclusion that Barack Obama is a “natural born citizen.”   

The first source rests on invalid logical argument.  We can all agree on the statement that all “natural born citizens” are born citizens.  From this truism, Maskell wants us to believe that since Barack Obama is a born citizen, he is also a “natural born citizen.”  This is a logically invalid argument.  It is as invalid as arguing that all poodles are dogs, and since Bubbles is a dog, Bubbles is a poodle.  The fallacy is clear to see once identified.  The problem with these fallacious arguments is in recognizing them when someone is trying to give us a snow job. 

The second source is based on unsound logical argument.  An argument can be logically valid but unsound (false).  This occurs when the argument is valid as to its form, but upon investigation, one learns that either the major or minor premise is false which produces a false conclusion.  In my article, I took Maskell’s invalid argument and made it into a valid one by presenting it in a valid logical form.  Thus I produced: 

All born citizens are “natural born citizens.”    
Obama is a born citizen.
Therefore, Obama is a “natural born citizen.” 

I demonstrated that while this argument is valid as to its form, it is unsound because the major premise, All born citizens are “natural born citizens,” is false.  It is false because the Founders, Framers, and Ratifiers wrote “natural born citizen,” not “born citizen.”  It is false because just being born a citizen has never been the test for being a “natural born citizen.”  The expression born citizen does not tell us how one becomes a born citizen.  It does not tell us who shall be said to be a born citizen.  It does not tell us what the facts and circumstances are which the definition of a “natural born citizen” states are necessary and sufficient to make one a born citizen and therefore a “natural born citizen.”  No U.S. Supreme Court has ever defined a “natural born citizen” by saying that anyone who is a born citizen is a “natural born citizen.”  There simply is no U.S. Supreme Court case that supports such a proposition.  Congress has never defined a “natural born citizen” as simply anyone who is born a citizen.  In other words, neither Jack Maskell nor anyone else has presented historical and legal evidence which demonstrates that all born citizens are “natural born citizens.”  On the contrary, I have shown that there has only ever been one definition of a “natural born citizen” and that is a child born in the country to parents who were its “citizens” at the time of the child’s birth.  This definition is, indeed, a real definition, for it provides those facts and circumstance which must be met in order for one to be a “natural born citizen.” 

Squeeky Fromm also tells us that no one ever heard of Emer de Vattel and that he is a non-figure when it comes to defining a “natural born citizen.”  She adds: 

“1. Most of us have some memory of high school civics class, and no memory whatsoever of anybody called Emer de Vattel. The Birthers try to supplant our non-existent memory with false memories of Vattel and his alleged two citizen parents theory of natural born citizenship. There are actually some people who now claim to remember being taught about Vattel in this light, and absolutely NO TEXTBOOKS which support that memory.”

Apart from all the extant historical evidence which proves Squeeky Fromm to be wrong about the definition of a “natural born citizen” and Vattel’s connection to that definition, there are numerous cases which show her to be wrong.  See: 

1.         Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Section 212 Citizens and natives (London 1797) (1st ed. Neuchatel 1758):  “The natives, or natural-born citizens, are those born in the country, of parents who are citizens.’” 

2.         The Venus, 12 U.S. 8 Cranch 253, 289 (1814) (C.J. Marshall concurring):  “Vattel, who, though not very full to this point, is more explicit and more satisfactory on it than any other whose work has fallen into my hands, says ‘The citizens are the members of the civil society; bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to its authority, they equally participate in its advantages. The natives or indigenes [having equivalent meaning to "natural-born citizens”] are those born in the country of parents who are citizens. Society not being able to subsist and to perpetuate itself but by the children of the citizens, those children naturally follow the condition of their fathers, and succeed to all their rights.’”  

3.         Inglis v. Sailors’ Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. 99 (1830): 

“II. The second general question is, whether John Inglis, the demandant, was or was not capable of taking lands in the state of New York by descent.

This question is presented under several aspects, for the purpose of meeting what at present from the evidence appears a little uncertain, as to the time of the birth of John Inglis. This question as here presented, does not call upon the court for an opinion upon the broad doctrine of allegiance and the right of expatriation, under a settled and unchanged state of society and government. But to decide what are the rights of the individuals composing that society, and living under the protection of that government, when a revolution occurs; a dismemberment takes place; new governments are formed; and new relations between the government and the people are established.”

After stating that the English common law broad allegiance no longer applied to the new America after the Revolution, it held:  


“2. If born [in New York] after the 4th of July 1776, and before the 15th of September of the same year, when the British took possession of New York, his infancy incapacitated him from making any election for himself, and his election and character followed that of his father, subject to the right of disaffirmance in a reasonable time after the termination of his minority; which never having been done, he remains a British subject, and disabled from inheriting the land in question.” 

Inglis v. Sailors’ Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. 99, 120-27, 3 Pet. 99. (1830). Rejecting the English common law jus soli rule and the rule of perpetual allegiance that may have prevailed in a state unless abrogated by statute and used for deciding questions of inheritance of lands located within a state’s jurisdiction, which rules were adopted by Justice Johnson and Justice Story in their concurring opinions, and rather adopting the national jus sanguinis rule of the law of nations, the Court held that if the child was born in New York when it was a new state to alien parents, the child followed the condition of his alien father, which could have been cast off at the age of majority, and never having been done the son was therefore neither a “natural born Citizen” nor a “citizen of the United States,” but rather alien born.  So, even though the child was born in New York after the Revolution, the U.S. Supreme Court, regardless of what the common or statutory law of New York might have been on the subject of allegiance, still ruled that the child was alien born, because the father was an alien at the time of the child’s birth. 

4.        Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. 242, 245 (1830):  As we saw above, in Inglis, Justice Story was in the minority on the question of whether the demandant was a citizen of the State of New York and thus a U.S. citizen.  Relying upon the English common law jus soli rule, he had ruled that if born in New York after July 4, 1776, but before the 15th of September of the same year, when the British took possession of New York, he was a U.S. citizen even though his father was a British subject.  But in Shanks, which was decided after Inglis, he accepted that the American Revolution changed the rules of allegiance in the new America and changed his position on allegiance and U.S. citizenship.  Here he started by saying: 


“After the elaborate opinions expressed in the case of Inglis vs. The Trustees of the Sailor’s Snug Harbour, ante p. 99, upon the question of alienage, growing out of the American Revolution; it is unnecessary to do more in delivering the opinion of the court in the present case, than to state, in a brief manner, the grounds on which our decision is founded.”

Justice Story, adopting the Inglis majority position which rejected the jus soli (citizenship through place of birth) of the English common law and accepted the jus sanguinis (citizenship inherited from parents) of the law of nations, then went on to explain: 

“If she was not of age, then she might well be deemed under the circumstances of this case to hold the citizenship of her father, for children born in a country, continuing while under age in the family of the father, partake of his national character as a citizen of that country.” Justice Johnson, dissenting for other reasons, said that Ann Scott (married Ann Shanks) “was a native born citizen of South Carolina, daughter of a native born citizen of North Carolina,” and that her being a citizen of South Carolina at the moment of her birth was established by the “leading maxim[] of common law,” “proles sequitur sortem paternam,” which means “the offspring follows the condition of the father.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1091 (5th ed. 1979).

5.         Barry v. Mercein, 46 U. S. 103 (1847):  Argument of counsel for John A. Barry, a British “natural born subject:”

“4.  The plaintiff in error being of legeance to the crown of England, his child, though born in the United States during his father’s temporary residence therein – twenty-two months and twenty days – not withstanding its mother be an American citizen, is not a citizen of the United States. It is incapacitate by its infancy from making any present election, follows the legeance of its father, partus sequitur patrem, and is a British subject. The father being domiciled and resident within the dominions of Her Britannic Majesty, such is also the proper and rightful domicil of his wife and child, and he has a legal right to remove them thither. The child being detained from the father, its natural guardian and protector, without authority of law, and writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum is his appropriate legal remedy for its restoration to him from its present illegal detention and restraint. Constitution United States, art. 3, sec. 2; Judiciary Act, 1789, sec. 11; Inglis v. Trustees Sailor’s Snug Harbor, 3 Peters, 99; 7 Anne, cap. 5; 4 Geo. III. cap. 21; Warrender v. Warrender, 2 Clar. & Fin. Ap. Ca. 523; Story’s Confl. Laws, 30, 36, 43, 74, 160; Shelford on Marriage, Ferg. Rep. 397, 398.” 

6.         Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 476-77 (1857) (J. Daniel concurring):  The decision only dealt with the question of whether Dred Scott was a “citizen of the United States.”  Nevertheless, Justice Daniel, concurring, defined a “natural born citizen.” While as repugnant as slavery was and still is, no court or amendment has over turned the meaning of “natural-born citizen” from Dred Scott as described by Justice Daniel nor has there ever been a need to do so.  The main point is that in deciding what a "citizen" was in 1856, both the majority and dissent went back to 1787 to examine what the Framers and the people of that time considered a "citizen" to be.  The Court said that the Constitution must be understood now as it was understood at the time it was written.  The judges did not disagree that one had to look back to the Founders.  What they disagreed on is what the public opinion was at that time as to whether a freed slave was a “citizen.”  In this regard, we know that the Court’s holding that freed slaves were not “citizens of the United States” was overruled by the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Thirteenth (ratified in 1865) and Fourteenth (ratified in 1868) Amendment, none of which repealed or amended Article II’s “natural born Citizen” clause. 

As to the “natural born Citizen” clause, Justice Daniel said: 
           
“The citizens are the members of the civil society; bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to its authority, they equally participate in its advantages.  The natives, or natural-born citizens, are those born in the country, of parents who are citizens.  As society cannot perpetuate itself otherwise than by the children of the citizens, those children naturally follow the condition of their parents, and succeed to all their rights.”  Again:  I say, to be of the country, it is necessary to be born of a person who is a citizen; for if he be born there of a foreigner, it will be only the place of his birth, and not his country.” 

(quoting and citing Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Section 212 (London 1797) (1st ed. Neuchatel 1758)).  It should be noted that Justice Daniel took out of Vattel’s definition the reference to “fathers” and “father” and replaced it with “parents” and “person,” respectively.  It is true that it was only Justice Daniel in his concurrence that defined a “natural born Citizen” the way he did.  But on more than one occasion, the United States Supreme Court has defined what a "natural born Citizen" is.  Justice Daniel’s definition of a “natural born Citizen” was first confirmed by Chief Justice John Marshall in The Venus (1814) and later confirmed by the unanimous Court in Minor and both the majority and dissent in Wong Kim Ark.  To this day, that definition has never been changed.    


7.         Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 168-170 (1875):  The unanimous U.S. Supreme Court explained:  “The Constitution does not, in words, say who shall be natural-born citizens."  Hence, the Court said that neither the original Constitution nor the Fourteenth Amendment (ratified in 1868) defined a "natural born citizen." In fact, there is nothing in the text of or debates on the Fourteenth Amendment which in any way suggests that it amended Article II and its "natural born citizen" clause.  The Court said that the Amendment did not add to the privileges and immunities enjoyed by the people prior to the adoption of that Amendment.  We know that these privileges and immunities enjoyed as a citizen of a state had been protected from state deprivation by Article IV and privileges and immunities enjoyed as a citizen of the United States were now also protected from state abridgement by the Fourteenth Amendment.  Hence, the Amendment could not have granted the privilege and right of being elected to the Office of President to persons who did not have that privilege and right prior to its adoption. 
 

The Court then further explained that since the Constitution did not provide the meaning of a "natural born citizen,"    

"[r]esort must be had elsewhere to ascertain that.  At common-law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners.  Some authorities go further and include as citizens children born within the jurisdiction without reference to the citizenship of their [p168] parents. As to this class there have been doubts, but never as to the first. For the purposes of this case it is not necessary to solve these doubts. It is sufficient for everything we have now to consider that all children born of citizen parents within the jurisdiction are themselves citizens. ”

Id. at 167-68. 

Hence, a child born in a country to parents who were its “citizens” was not only a “citizen” like them, but also a “natural-born citizen,” which maybe his or her parents were not.  Under that same common law, all the rest of the people were "aliens or foreigners," who the Court later explained could become "citizens of the United States" by satisfying naturalization Acts of Congress or maybe the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Court also sua sponte  stated that "some authorities" went further and included as "citizens"  children "born within the jurisdiction" to alien parents.  The Court said that while "there have been doubts" about whether such children born  in the United States to alien parents were "citizens," there never had been any doubts that children born in the country to citizens parents, who the Court called "natural-born citizens," were "citizens."  So the Court basically said that with the "natural born citizens," there were no doubts that they were "citizens."  But with non-"natural born citizens," such as children born in the United States to alien parents, who could look to no other law other than the Fourteenth Amendment to gain U.S. citizenship status, there could be doubts about whether they were even just "citizens." So, exactly from where did the citizenship doubts to which the Court was referring come? They surely did not come from the English common law which based on birthright, naturalized at birth as "natural-born subjects" children born in the King's dominion to alien parents.  So the Court could not have been looking to the English common law for its definition of a "natural born citizen," for that law provided no doubt as to the "natural-born subject" status of children born in the King's dominion to alien parents.  Also, the Court's doubts could not have come from the common law to which the Court said the Framers looked for their definition of a "natural born citizen," for under that common law there was no doubt that such children were not "natural born citizens."  Rather, those doubts came from the new Fourteenth Amendment and its ambiguous "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" clause, which the U.S. Supreme Court in The Slaughterhouse Cases (1873) (virtually the same Court as the Minor Court) said excluded from U.S. citizenship children born in the United States to alien parents.  So these Fourteenth Amendment potential citizens could not be "natural born citizens" under Minor's formulation, for there was no doubt that they did not meet its common law definition of the clause. They also could not even just be "citizens of the United States" under the English common law, for that law had no application in national U.S. citizenship.  The doubts were whether they could be plain "citizens of the United States" under the Fourteenth Amendment. With Virginia Minor being born in the country to "citizen" parents and thus a "natural born citizen," which without any doubt made her a "citizen" and therefore qualified to receive the privileges and immunities available under Article IV and the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment (which the Court eventually held did not include the right to vote), Minor said that it was not necessary to resolve the question that it raised about Fourteenth Amendment citizenship.   U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark (1898) eventually resolved this question.  See my discussion below on Wong Kim Ark. 

 
8.         Ex parte Reynolds, 20 F.Cas. 582, 5 Dill. 394, No. 11,719 (C.C.W.D.Ark 1879):  The Circuit Court of the Western District of Arkansas explained:

“[W]hen the question arises as to what people a person belongs, what rule is to govern in the solution of the problem?

There is no statute law on the subject. We find that the question before the country at one time, as to who was a white person and who was a member of the African race, was solved by legislative or       constitutional enactments defining the nationality of persons according to the quantum of white or African blood in the veins of the persons.

These laws were all enactments of the states, and had reference to the African race alone. The United States never had any statute law on the subject (and has not now) with regard to persons who are not subject to its jurisdiction. Now, in this case, as the 38th article of the treaty only permits an American citizen, or a white person, to expatriate himself -- to throw off his allegiance to the government of the United States -- and place himself beyond the jurisdiction of its courts by marriage to a Choctaw and residence in their country, we must somewhere find a rule to define who is a Choctaw, in [**15]  a case where there is mixed parentage. Does the quantum of Indian blood in the veins of the party determine the fact as to whether such party is of the white or Indian race? If so, how much Indian blood does it take to make an Indian, or how much white blood to make a person a member of the body politic known as American citizens? Where do we find any rule on the subject which makes the quantum of blood the standard of nationality? Certainly not from the statute law of the United States; nor is it to be found in the common law. In the case of United States v. Sanders [Case No. 16,220], the court held that the quantum of Indian blood in the veins did not determine the condition of the offspring of a union between a white person and an Indian; but further held that the condition of the mother did determine the question. And the court referred to the common law as authority for the position that the condition of the mother fixed the status of the offspring. The court is sustained in the first position by the common law, and also in the last position, if applied to the offspring of a connection between a freeman and a slave, upon the principle handed down from the Roman civil law,  [**16]  that the owner of a female animal is entitled to all her brood, according to the maxim partus sequitur ventrem. But by the common law this rule is reversed with regard to the offspring of free persons. Their offspring follows the condition of the father, and the rule partus sequitur patrem prevails in determining their status. 1 Bouv. Inst., 198, § 502; 31 Barb. 486; 2 Bouv. Law Dict. 147; Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet. [28 U.S.] 242. This is the universal maxim of the common law with regard to freemen -- as old as the common law, or even as the Roman civil law, and as well settled as the rule partus sequitur ventrem -- the one being a rule fixing the status of freemen; the other being a rule defining the ownership of property -- the one applicable to different political communities or states, whose citizens are in the enjoyment of the civil rights possessed by people in a state of freedom; the other defining the condition of the offspring which had been tainted by the bondage of the mother.
No other rules than the ones above enumerated ever did prevail in this or any other civilized country. In the case of Ludlam v. Ludlam, 31 Barb. 486, the court says: "The universal maxim of [**17]  the common law being partus sequitur patrem, it is sufficient for the application of this doctrine that the father should be a subject lawfully, and without breach of his allegiance beyond sea, no matter what may be the condition of the mother."

The law of nations, which becomes, when applicable to an existing condition of affairs in a country, a part of the common law of that country, declares the same rule. Vattel, in his Law of Nations (page 101), says: "As the society cannot exist and perpetuate itself otherwise than by the children of the citizens, these children naturally follow the condition of their fathers and succeed to their rights. * * * The country of the father is, therefore, that of the children, and these become true citizens merely by their tacit consent." Again, on page 102, Vattel says: "By the law of nature alone, children follow the condition of their fathers and enter into all their rights." This law of nature, as far as it has become a part of the common law, in the absence of any positive enactment on the subject, must be the rule in this case.”

Id. at 585, 18 Alb.Law J. 14-17 (cited with approval in United States v. Ward, 42 F.320; 1890 U.S. App. LEXIS 1586; 14 Sawy. 472 (C.C. S.D.Cal 1890) and Keith v. United States, 8 Okla. 446, 448, 58 P. 507 (1899)).   

9.         Ludlam v. Ludlam, 26 N.Y. 356 (1883):  “Vattel says: ‘ Society not being able to subsist and perpetuate itself, but by the children of its citizens, those children naturally follow the condition of their fathers and succeed to all their rights.’ B. 1, ch. 19, § 212.” 

10.       United States v. Ward, 42 F.320 (C.C.S.D.Cal. 1890):  “By the common law this rule [partus sequitur ventrem] is reversed with regard to the offspring of free persons. Their offspring follows the condition of the father, and the rule partus sequitur patrem prevails in determining their status. 1 Bouv. Inst., 198, § 502; 31 Barb. 486; 2 Bouv. Law Dict. 147; Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet. [28 U.S.] 242. This is the universal maxim of the common law with regard to freemen -- as old as the common law, or even as the Roman civil law, and as well settled as the rule partus sequitur ventrem -- the one being a rule fixing the status of freemen; the other being a rule defining the ownership of property -- the one applicable to different political communities or states, whose citizens are in the enjoyment of the civil rights possessed by people in a state of freedom; the other defining the condition of the offspring which had been tainted by the bondage of the mother.

No other rules than the ones above enumerated ever did prevail in this or any other civilized country. In the case of Ludlam v. Ludlam, 31 Barb. 486, the court says: ‘The universal maxim of the common law being partus sequitur patrem, it is sufficient for the application of this doctrine that the father should be a subject lawfully, and without breach of his allegiance beyond sea, no matter what may be the condition of the mother.’

The law of nations, which becomes, when applicable to an existing condition of affairs in a country, a part of the common law of that country, declares the same rule. Vattel, in his Law of Nations (page 101), says: ‘As the society cannot exist and perpetuate itself otherwise than by the children of the citizens, these children naturally follow the condition of their fathers and succeed to their rights. * * * The country of the father is, therefore, that of the children, and these become true citizens merely by their tacit consent.’ Again, on page 102, Vattel says: ‘By the law of nature alone, children follow the condition of their fathers and enter into all their rights.’ This law of nature, as far as it has become a part of the common law, in the absence of any positive enactment on the subject, must be the rule in this case.”   

11.       United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 679-80 (1898):  Confirmed Minor’s “natural-born citizen” definition when it said: “'At common-law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners” (citing and quoting Minor), and not being limited by the definition of a “natural-born citizen” when defining who a “citizen” was under the Fourteenth Amendment, held that a child born in the United States to domiciled and resident alien parents was a “citizen” under the Fourteenth Amendment.   

Wong Kim Ark eventually resolved Minor's open question, holding that a child born in the United States to permanently domiciled and resident alien parents was a "citizen of the United States" from the moment of birth by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment.  It is critically constitutionally important to understand that the Court held Wong to be a "citizen" under the Fourteenth Amendment.  It did not hold that he was a "natural born citizen" under the common law with which the Framers were familiar when they drafted the Constitution and which according to Minor provided the definition of a "natural born citizen."   

People like Squeeky Fromm also use Wong Kim Ark to tell us about how the decision so well met the needs of our nation of immigrants who have come to our shores thirsting for freedom and opportunity, mixing that noble goal into the definition of a “natural born citizen.”  The simple response to this “feel good” argument is that immigrants coming to America are looking to become “citizens,” not “natural born citizens,” which is a status that their children can enjoy like the children of the Founders, Framers, and Ratifiers enjoyed.  Hence, this appeal to tradition is nothing but a fallacious argument applied to the definition of a “natural born citizen.”      

Despite Squeeky Fromm’s lack of memory of who Emer de Vattel was, all these decisions from our U.S. Supreme Court and these lower courts confirmed Vattel’s Section 212 definition of the “natural-born citizens” as “those born in the country, of parents who are citizens.”  This is the only definition of the clause that has ever existed and which has been recognized by our U.S. Supreme Court.  The conditions of being born in the country to “citizen” parents are both necessary and sufficient conditions of being a “natural born Citizen.”  The definition of a “natural born Citizen” therefore excludes anyone who is either not born in the country (or its jurisdictional equivalent) or not born to parents (both parents) who are its “citizens” at the time of the child’s birth or both. 

Squeeky Fromm takes the second part of my article, the one related to an unsound argument, and presents herself as some authority on the matter.  She presents a statement suggesting that I, the one who raised and discussed the issue in the first place, do not recognize the issue concerning the truth of the major premise.  I clearly not only recognized the issue, I created it as part of my logical analysis.  I also demonstrated, as can be seen above, how there is no truth to the Jack Maskell thesis that all born citizens are “natural born citizens.”   I did all that so that the public can see how Jack Maskell ultimately is wrong in his argument.
  
V.                 

Squeeky Fromm’s most recent foray is bringing Trayvon Martin into the “natural born citizen” debate. In her article, The George Zimmerman Verdict and Birtherism, at http://birtherthinktank.wordpress.com/2013/07/16/the-george-zimmerman-verdict-and-birtherism/ , she argues that Birthers are like “Trayvonites.”   She argues that the Zimmerman verdict was correct because the rule of law and the right to self-defense required it, but that Trayvon Martin’s supporters refuse to see the light.  What Squeeky Fromm fails to understand is that the Constitutionalists (whom she calls the “Birthers”) have taken the position that they have because of the Constitution and the rule of law.  What is ironic is that a commenter on her blog, “Joel Lawler,” has attacked her as being a racist for her pro-Zimmerman position.  He has told her to “take a deep look into your own sad racist soul.”  She defends her position, saying that the evidence and law require it.   So here we see Squeeky Fromm arguing that such decisions must be decided by the Constitution and the rule of law and not by other extraneous factors such as emotion, anger, prejudice, or revenge.  But she does not grant the “Birthers” the same right to argue that Obama is not a “natural born Citizen.”  We can only conclude from Squeeky Fromm’s inconsistent positions that the Constitution and the rule of law count for her only when it is politically expedient that they do so.    

So, Squeeky Fromm has failed to discredit my Jack Maskell refutation in her several articles (the links are above).  She continues to embarrass herself with her own artistic muddle.  She understands what the Constitution and the rule of law mean, but she applies them selectively and only for political expediency.     

In referring to the topic of her gaslighting article ( http://birtherthinktank.wordpress.com/2013/07/14/are-the-birthers-gaslighting-themselves/ ) blogger ppsimmons, this is what Squeeky Fromm ironically said to one of her sycophants: 

"Hi FrankB!!!

Thank you!!! Somebody had to de-construct him. Why do these guys try to put on airs like they know what they are talking about??? All they do is make trouble for themselves.” 

Too bad that Artsy Fartsy Squeeky Fromm Girl Reporter does not follow her own advice. 

Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
July 19, 2013
Updated March 8, 2014
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