Monday, May 25, 2015

Senator Cruz, Senator Rubio, and Governor Jindal Should Not Be Allowed to Participate in the Presidential Debates Because They, Like De Facto President Obama, Are All Not Natural Born Citizens and Therefore Not Eligible to Be President

Senator Cruz, Senator Rubio, and Governor Jindal Should Not Be Allowed to Participate in the Presidential Debates Because They, Like De Facto President Obama, Are All Not Natural Born Citizens and Therefore Not Eligible to Be President

By Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
May 25, 2015

Soon, we will see various presidential candidates debate each other for the right to win their party’s nomination for President and ultimately to win the people’s and Electoral College’s vote for that Office.  The organizations that will be sponsoring these presidential debates, Commission on Presidential Debates, Fox News, Fox Business Network, Reagan Library Foundation, Salem Media Group, CNBC, ABC, CBS, NBC, Telemundo, and National Review, in keeping with their bylaws, should not allow any person who is not constitutionally eligible for that office to debate.  Allowing constitutionally ineligible candidates to debate will only give the false impression to the American people that such persons are constitutionally eligible to be elected President.  This result is more damaging to the Constitution and the rule of law, given that the federal courts refused to get involved in the question of whether de facto President Barack Obama is an Article II natural born citizen.  There has been mentioned in the news of some individuals who will be vying for the Office of President.  These are Senator Ted Cruz, Senator Marco Rubio, and Governor Bobby Jindal.  But these individuals, like Obama, are not natural born citizens and hence not eligible to be elected President.  They should therefore not be allowed to debate.  Allow me to explain. 

Article II, Section 1, Clause 5 provides that for those born before the adoption of the Constitution, having satisfied the 35 years age and 14 years residency requirements, being a "citizen" of the United States was sufficient to be eligible to be President.  It also provides that for those born after the adoption, only a "natural born citizen" of the United States is eligible to be President.  So, with presidential eligibility under Article II, for those born after the adoption of the Constitution, we are looking to define a natural born citizen, not a citizen.  We can also see from this constitutional scheme that in the United States there are only “citizens” or “natural born citizens” and that all natural born citizens are citizens, but not all citizens are natural born citizens. 

The Framers used the natural born citizen clause to assure that future Presidents and Commanders in Chief of the Military would be born citizens of and in allegiance with only the United States from the moment of birth and throughout their lives.  They concluded that such a person would be one to least have sympathies for some foreign power or influence which could result in conflict of interests which could harm the United States and its people.    

Since the Framers wrote citizen and natural born citizen into the Constitution, the next question is what do these terms mean?  The historical and legal record demonstrates that they did not look to the English common law for the definitions of those terms.  Indeed, Justice Noah H. Swayne, commenting on whether the English common law defined a “citizen” or a “natural born citizen,” said:  “The constitution uses the words 'citizen' and 'natural born citizens;' but neither that instrument nor any act of congress has attempted to define their meaning.  British jurisprudence, whence so much of our own is drawn, throws little light upon the subject . . . . Blackstone and Tomlin contain nothing upon the subject.”  United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785,  788 (Cir. Ct. Ky 1866).  Rather, that record shows that the Founders and Framers looked to natural law and the law of nations and the Enlightenment for principles which justified and motivated the American Revolution, the Declaration of Independence, and the writing of the Constitution.   It was also in natural law and the law of nations that they found their definitions of citizens and natural born citizens. 

As their most trusted expert on the law of nations, the Founders and Framers looked to Emer de Vattel.  In his, The Law of Nations or Principles of Natural Law, Book I, Chapter XIX, Section 212 (1758) (1797), Vattel defined a citizen as:   “The citizens are the members of the civil society: bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to its authority, they equally participate in its advantages. Id. at Section 212.  The Framers also knew from the teachings of both the English common law and the law of nations that citizenship and allegiance can be either inherited from one’s parents (jus sanguinis) or acquired from being born in a country (jus soli).  Hence, when the Framers wrote the Constitution, a citizen was any member of the United States made so by any means, which included the American Revolution, Acts of Congress, or treaty.  These citizens were subject to the laws of the United States and enjoyed all the privileges, immunities, and rights of all other citizens, including the right of being protected by the United States.  The early naturalization Acts of Congress reflected this understanding.  As time went on and because of the immediate need to make freed slaves citizens of the United States, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment were added to the list of laws that could make citizens.  As we shall see below, these laws, while capable of making one a citizen from the moment of birth or after birth, did not make one a natural born citizen.  

The Framers also defined a natural born citizen under natural law and the law of nations.  Again looking to Vattel upon whom they would have relied for that definition, he defined a natural born citizen as follows: 

The natives, or natural-born citizens, are those born in the country, of parents who are citizens. As the society cannot exist and perpetuate itself otherwise than by the children of the citizens, those children naturally follow the condition of their fathers, and succeed to all their rights. The society is supposed to desire this, in consequence of what it owes to its own preservation; and it is presumed, as matter of course, that each citizen, on entering into society, reserves to his children the right of becoming members of it. The country of the fathers is therefore that of the children; and these become true citizens merely by their tacit consent. We shall soon see, whether, on their coming to the years of discretion, they may renounce their right, and what they owe to the society in which they were born. I say, that, in order to be of the country, it is necessary that a person be born of a father who is a citizen; for if he is born there of a foreigner, it will be only the place of his birth, and not his country.”

Id. Sec. 212 Citizens and natives.  We can see that Vattel expected not the citizens, but the natural born citizens as being the persons upon whom the expectation lied as being the ones who would best protect and perpetuate the civil and political society into which they were born.  

Under this natural law and law of nations rule, a natural born citizen had to do nothing other than be born in the county to parents who were both citizens of that country.  No law, including any naturalization act or treaty, was needed to make him or her a natural born citizen. 

The universal and immutable principle of the law of nations that defined a natural born citizen was incorporated into American national common law.  We know this by what the unanimous U.S. Supreme Court said in Minor.  There it explained: 

At common law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children, born in a country, of parents who were its citizens, became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives, or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners. Some authorities go further and include as citizens children born within the jurisdiction, without reference to the citizenship of their parents. As to this class there have been doubts, but never as to the first. For the purposes of this case it is not necessary to solve these doubts. It is sufficient, for everything we have now to consider, that all children, born of citizen parents within the jurisdiction, are themselves citizens.

Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 167-68 (1875).

So Minor explained that it was this common law to which the Framers looked to define a natural born citizen.  Accord U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark (1898) (distinguishing a natural born citizen from a citizen of the United States under the Fourteenth Amendment, said that “[t]he child of an alien, if born in the country” can be a citizen of the United States from the moment of birth by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment and “is as much a citizen as the natural born child of a citizen, and by operation of the same principle").  Hence, the Framers defined a natural born citizen as a child born in a country to parents who were its citizens at the time of the child's birth.  Under that same common law, they saw all the rest of the people as "aliens or foreigners," who could be naturalized under some positive law.  With the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, those otherwise aliens or foreigners became citizens of the United States “at birth” under Wong Kim Ark’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

The definition of a natural born citizen as reflected in American common law became under Article IV, Clause 2 upon ratification of the Constitution the supreme law of the land subject to change under Article V only by duly ratified constitutional amendment.  

During the Founding and until the Cable Act of 1922 (ch. 411, 42 Stat. 1021, "Married Women’s Independent Nationality Act") was passed, married parents of children were both either U.S. citizens or aliens.  See Minor and Wong Kim Ark (only provided for scenarios in which the child’s parents were both either citizens or aliens).  Hence, citizen parents meant that both father and mother had to be citizens. The Cable Act reversed former immigration laws regarding marriage. 
Previously, a woman lost her U.S. citizenship if she married an alien, since she acquired the citizenship of her husband.  The law did not apply to men who married foreign women, for such women became U.S. citizens.   The law repealed sections 3 and 4 of the Expatriation Act of 1907.  With this new law, women did not lose their citizenship if they married an alien, provided he was an alien eligible to be naturalized under U.S. law.  Marian L. Smith, "Women and Naturalization, ca. 1802-1940," Prologue Magazine 30 (2) (1998).  Additionally, under the Act, women who married aliens who were eligible for naturalization could keep their U.S. citizenship, provided they lived in the United States.  If they married such aliens and lived on foreign soil for two years, they could lose their U.S. citizenship. In 1931, an amendment allowed females to retain their U.S. citizenship even if they married aliens who were not eligible for U.S. citizenship (e.g. at that time an Asian).  The Cable Act was repealed in 1936. The liberation of wives from their husband’s citizenship done by the 1922 Cable Act, an Act of Congress and not a constitutional amendment, has not nor could it amend the constitutional rule that both father and mother had to be citizens at the time of their child’s birth in their country in order to make a natural born citizen. 

To date, the American national common law meaning of a natural born citizen has never been changed by any constitutional amendment or decision of the U.S. Supreme Court.  
    
So, a "citizen" of the United States "at birth" is defined by either the Fourteenth Amendment (only if born in the U.S.) or naturalization Act of Congress (if born in or out of the U.S.).  Regarding the former, it is any person born in the United States and "subject to the jurisdiction thereof."  As to the latter, it includes any person born out of the United States to one or two U.S. citizen parents.  Neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor Act of Congress has any impact on the meaning of a natural born citizen, for, not only because they did not exist when the Constitution was adopted and ratified, but also because they did not repeal or amend the natural born citizen clause or define it. Under these well-established rules, a child of one or two alien parents, if born in the U.S., can be a "citizen" of the United States "at birth" under the Fourteenth Amendment.  A child born out of the U.S., if born to one or two U.S. citizen parents, can also be a "citizen" of the United States "at birth." But not being born in the United States to two U.S. citizen parents, neither of them can be an Article II "natural born citizen" of the United States, regardless of their "at birth" citizen status, for they are born citizens, not natural born citizens.   
    
De facto President Barack Obama is not a natural born citizen because, even if he was born in the United States, he was not born to two U.S. citizen parents.  Obama was born to a U.S. citizen mother, but to a non-U.S. citizen father.  His father was a citizen of Great Britain and then Kenya upon it gaining independence in 1963.  Senator Ted Cruz is also not a natural born citizen.  Unlike Senator John McCain who was born in Panama to two U.S. citizen parents who were serving the national defense of the United States and therefore reputed born in the United States to two U.S. citizen parents, Senator Cruz was born in Canada presumably to a U.S. citizen mother and a non-U.S. citizen father who was a citizen of Cuba and both in Canada for private purposes.  Senator Marco Rubio and Governor Bobby Jindal are also not natural born citizens, for while they were born in the United States, they were born to two non-U.S. citizen parents who were citizens of Cuba and India, respectively.     

If they are not natural born citizens, then what are they?  President Obama, Senator Cruz, Senator Rubio, and Governor Jindal are all "citizens" of the United States "at birth,” but only by virtue of some non-common law positive law.  None of them are "natural born citizens" by virtue of common law which provides the only definition of the clause which is a child born in a country to parents (father and mother) who were its citizens at the time of the child's birth. Obama (if born in the United States), Rubio, and Jindal are “citizens” of the United States “at birth,” but only because of the Fourteenth Amendment, by the only fact of being born in the United States.  Cruz is a “citizen” of the United States “at birth,” but only because of a naturalization Act of Congress, by the only fact of being born to one U.S. citizen parent.  None of them were born with the complete facts and circumstances needed at birth to be a natural born citizen and which allows one to be a natural born citizen and therefore a citizen without the aid of any positive law.  They are all missing either birth to two U.S. citizen parents or birth in the United States. Obama was born a citizen of and in allegiance to the United States (through jus soli if he was born in the United States) and Great Britain and then Kenya upon conversion through its independence from Great Britain (through jus sanguinis from his father).  Cruz was born a citizen of and in allegiance to the United States (through jus sanguinis if his mother was still a U.S. citizen at the time of his birth) and born a citizen of and in allegiance to Canada (through jus soli) and Cuba (through jus sanguinis from his father).  Rubio and Jindal were born citizens of and in allegiance to the United States (through jus soli) and Cuba (through jus sanguinis from both of their parents).  They are all therefore under U.S. law not born with sole allegiance to the United States, but also subject to a foreign power and with natural sympathies for those foreign nations, a condition that the Framers did not allow future Presidents and Commanders to have.  Being born subject to foreign powers and influence and with such sympathies, they are not nor can they be natural born citizens.  Not being natural born citizens, they are not eligible to be President. 

These ineligible candidates should not be allowed to participate in the upcoming presidential debates.   

Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
May 25, 2015
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Copyright © 2015
Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
All Rights Reserved






Friday, March 13, 2015

A Response to Neal Katyal and Paul Clement on the Meaning of a Natural Born Citizen

A Response to Neal Katyal and Paul Clement on the Meaning of a Natural Born Citizen

By Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
March 13, 2015

I read the March 11, 2015 article entitled, “On the Meaning of a ‘Natural Born Citizen,” written by Neal Katyal and Paul Clement, found at 128 Harv.L.Rev.F 161, and accessed at http://harvardlawreview.org/2015/03/on-the-meaning-of-natural-born-citizen/ .  The first sentence of the article says:  “We have both had the privilege of heading the Office of the Solicitor General.”  The article repeats the existing talking points offered in support of the constitutional eligibility of Senator Ted Cruz (all born citizens are natural born citizens) and offers nothing new.  Mr. Cruz was born in Canada to a U.S. citizen mother and a non-U.S. citizen (Cuban) father.  I have written a recent article in which I conclude that Mr. Cruz is not a natural born citizen and therefore not eligible to be President because he does not satisfy the one and only common law definition of a natural born citizen confirmed by the unanimous U.S. Supreme Court in Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875), which is a child born in a country to parents who were its citizens at the time of the child’s birth.  The article is entitled, “What Do President Obama and Senator Cruz Have In Common? They Are Both Not Natural Born Citizens," accessed at http://puzo1.blogspot.com/2015/02/what-do-president-obama-and-senator.html .  Katyal and Clement maintain that any child who becomes a citizen at birth, regardless of where born or by what means, is a natural born citizen.  They add that since Mr. Cruz became a citizen from the moment of birth and did not need any naturalization after birth he is a natural born citizen.  But there is no historical and legal evidence which demonstrates that this is how the Framers defined a natural born citizen and the authors surely have not presented that evidence even if it did exist. 

The authors’ argument suffers from the fallacy of bald assertion.  They provide no convincing evidence for their position on who is included as an Article II natural born citizen.  They do not examine what was the source of the Framers' definition of an Article II natural born citizen, let alone what was the definition of a natural born citizen when the Framers drafted and adopted the Constitution and when it was eventually ratified.  They ignore so much of the historical and legal record in coming to their bald conclusions. For a discussion of this historical and legal evidence, see the numerous articles that I have written and posted at my blog, http://puzo1.blogspot.com .

They gloss over what the Framers' purpose was for requiring the President and Commander in Chief of the Military to be a natural born citizen.  They do not engage in any real discussion on what the Framers were trying to achieve through the clause. They dismiss all debate on the subject of foreign influence by flatly stating without any evidence:  "The Framers did not fear such machinations from those who were U.S. citizens from birth just because of the happenstance of a foreign birthplace."

The authors cite to the Naturalization Act of 1790 and ignore the fact that the Naturalization Act of 1795, with the lead of then-Rep. James Madison and with the approval of President George Washington, repealed it and specifically changed "shall be considered as natural born citizens" to "shall be considered as citizens of the United States."  This is even more a blatant omission given that they argue that the English naturalization statutes referred to persons born out of the King's dominion to British subject parents as "natural born subjects."  They fail to address this critical change made by our early Congress, critical because Article II, Section 1, Clause 5 provides that a “Citizen” of the United States was eligible to be President only if born before the adoption of the Constitution and that thereafter only a “natural born Citizen” was so eligible.  Hence, Congress referring to one as a citizen rather than a natural born citizen, given the presidential eligibility requirements of Article II, was a serious thing.  They do not discuss what the language of the 1790 Act, "shall be considered as," meant.  They fail to address the issue that this was naturalization language and nothing more.  They fail to discuss whether Congress even had the constitutional power to make anyone born out of the United States a natural born citizen, if that was Congress’s intent in the first place.

They assert without demonstrating that the English common law supports their position.  But they totally ignore that under the English common law, only persons born in the King's dominion and under his jurisdiction were natural born subjects and that those born out of the dominion and therefore out of his jurisdiction became subjects only through a naturalization Act of Parliament.

They cite to Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, but they do not cite to Emer de Vattel and his The Laws of Nations (1758) (1797) or Minor, two leading sources that inform on U.S. citizenship.  Both Vattel and Minor defined a natural born citizen as a child born in a country to parents who were its citizens.  What is incredible is that they cite U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) to demonstrate that British statutes called children born out of the King's dominion to subject parents "natural born."  But they fail to tell the reader that Wong Kim Ark considered children born out of the United States to U.S. citizen parents to be naturalized by acts of Congress. In fact, they give virtually no discussion of the Wong Kim Ark case because they know that the case said that under the English common law, only children born in the King’s dominion and under his jurisdiction were natural born subjects and that any child born  out of that dominion needed an act of Parliament to naturalize him or her.  They also fail to discuss the U.S. Supreme Court case of Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971), in which both majority and dissent said the same as Wong Kim Ark which was that children born out of the United States to U.S. citizen parents become citizens of the United States only through the grace of Congress who made them citizens through a naturalization Act without which those children would be aliens.   It simply defies logic and good reason to conclude that a person who would not be a citizen at all without a naturalization act of Congress is a natural born citizen.

Katyal and Clement argue that John Jay had children born out of the United States while he was on diplomatic assignment and that he would not have disqualified his own children from being natural born citizens.  This is a really baseless point since Jay's children would have been born out of the United States to parents who were serving the national defense of the United States and therefore reputed born in the United States.  Likewise, they present the John McCain situation as proof for their position.  But they fail to realize that John McCain was born in Panama to U.S. citizen parents who were serving the national defense of the United States which makes him reputed born in the United States to U.S. citizen parents and therefore a natural born citizen under the one and only common law definition of a natural born citizen as confirmed by unanimous U.S. Supreme Court in Minor.  See Vattel, Section 217 (children born out of the country to citizen parents serving in the armies of the state are reputed born in the country).  They give the examples of Senator Barry Goldwater and Governor George Romney who they say were eligible to serve as President although neither was born within a state. The argument is meritless, for they were both born to U.S. citizen parents in U.S. sovereign territory subject to no foreign power and hence were born in part of the country known as the United States, all of which made them natural born citizens under the common law definition of a natural born citizen.

The authors conclude without demonstrating:  "Despite the happenstance of a birth across the border, there is no question that Senator Cruz has been a citizen from birth and is thus a “natural born Citizen” within the meaning of the Constitution."  They simply make this conclusion without having shown how their position is valid given the historical and legal record.

The authors also show contempt to the constitutional requirement that the President has to be a natural born citizen and for any person who dare raise any such issue.  For example, they say: "simply because he was delivered at a hospital abroad," rather than saying that he was born in a foreign nation; "born in a Canadian hospital," rather than saying that he was born in Canada;  "[d]espite the happenstance of a birth across the border;"  they call arguments with which they do not agree "spurious;" and they consider objections to candidate's eligibility as "specious objections to candidates eligibility," as if no one ever made any valid argument.

In short, Katyal and Clement’s article lacks any critical research and reasoning and is nothing more than an attempt to convince the reader that Senator Cruz is a natural born citizen because they said so and the reader has to believe that because they were former heads of the Office of Solicitor General of the United States.

Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
March 13, 2015

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Copyright © 2015
Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
All Rights Reserved





Friday, February 20, 2015

What Do President Obama and Senator Cruz Have In Common? They Are Both Not Natural Born Citizens



What Do President Obama and Senator Cruz Have In Common?  They Are Both Not Natural Born 
                                                                  Citizens

                                                         By Mario Apuzzo, Esq. 
                                                             February 20, 2015




Article II, Section 1, Clause 5 provides:

No person except a natural-born citizen, or a citizen of the United States, at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President; neither shall any person be eligible to that office, who shall not have attained to the age of thirty-five years, and been fourteen years a resident within the United States.” 

This constitutional provision raises two questions:  who are the “citizens” of the United States?; and who are the “natural born citizens” of the United States?  Let us examine these questions.   

Members of nations that are politically constituted as republics are called citizens. 

Citizens can be either citizens from the moment of birth or after birth.

Persons who are citizens from the moment of birth are automatically made so by either their birth circumstances alone or by some law that grants them that birth status without which they would not be so recognized.  In the United States, the former are the “natural born citizens” of the United States and the latter are “citizens” of the United States “at birth.”   Those who are made citizens after birth are also made so by circumstances or by some law without which they would also not be citizens.  In the United States, these citizens are commonly called “naturalized” citizens of the United States, meaning they did not acquire their citizenship automatically at the moment of their birth, but rather after birth through circumstances (the original citizens of the United States who acquired that status by adhering to the American Revolution) or formal naturalization process.   

Thomas Jefferson in The Declaration of Independence wrote about “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God” entitling the American people to “the separate but equal Station” “among the Powers of the Earth.”  To understand why he would have used these words which also leads us to an understanding of what a natural born citizen is, consider this passage regarding what Aristotle, the Stoics, Christian teaching, and modern thought said about natural law or natural right:

Aristotle  

It is in accordance with the general character of Aristotle’s philosophy that his teaching regarding natural right is much closer to the ordinary understanding of justice than is Plato’s [see Aristotle]. In his Rhetoric he speaks of “the law according to nature” as the unchangeable law common to all men, but it is not entirely certain that he takes that law to be more than something generally admitted and hence useful in forensic rhetoric. At least two of his three examples of natural law do not agree with what he himself regarded as naturally right (Rhetoric 1373b4-18). In the Nicomachean Ethics (1134bl8-1135a5) he speaks not, indeed, of natural law but of natural right. Natural right is that right which has everywhere the same power and does not owe its validity to human enactment. Aristotle does not give a single explicit example; but he seems to imply that such things as helping fellow citizens who are victims of misfortune resulting from the performance of a civic duty, and worshiping the gods by sacrifices, belong to natural right. If this interpretation is correct, natural right is that right which must be recognized by any political society if it is to last and which for this reason is everywhere in force. Natural right thus understood delineates the minimum conditions of political life, so much so that sound positive right occupies a higher rank than natural right. Natural right in this sense is indifferent to the difference among regimes, whereas positive right is relative to the type of regime—positive right is democratic, oligarchic, etc. (cf. Politics 1280a8-22). “Yet,” Aristotle concludes his laconic statement on natural right, “one regime alone is by nature the best everywhere.” This regime, “the most divine regime,” is a certain kind of kingship, the only regime that does not require any positive right (Politics 1284a4-15; 1288al5-29). The flooring and the ceiling, the minimum condition and the maximum possibility of political society, are natural and do not in any way depend on (positive) law.

Stoicism

Natural law becomes a philosophic theme for the first time in Stoicism. It there becomes the theme not primarily of moral or political philosophy but of physics (the science of the universe). The natural (or divine or eternal) law is identified with God, the highest god (fire, ether, or air), or his reason, i.e., with the ordering principle that pervades and thus governs the whole by molding eternal matter. Rational beings can know that law and knowingly comply with it insofar as it applies to their conduct. In this application natural law directs man toward his perfection, the perfection of a rational and social animal; it is “the guide of life and the teacher of the duties” (Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods I, 40); it is the dictate of reason regarding human life. Thus the virtuous life as choice worthy for its own sake comes to be understood as compliance with natural law—with a law, and hence as a life of obedience.

Inversely, the content of natural law is the whole of virtue. The virtuous life as the Stoics understood it is, however, not identical with the life of moral virtue (as distinguished from the life of contemplation), for one of the four cardinal virtues is wisdom that is above all theoretical wisdom; the virtuous man is the wise man or the philosopher. One is tempted to say that the Stoics treat the study of philosophy as if it were a moral virtue, i.e., as something which could be demanded from most men. Justice, another of the four virtues, consists primarily in doing what is by nature right. The foundation of right is man’s natural inclination to love his fellow men, not merely his fellow citizens: there is a natural society comprising all men (as well as all gods). The inclination toward the universal society is perfectly compatible with the equally natural inclination toward political society, which is of necessity a particular society. The unchangeable and universally valid natural law—a part of which determines natural right, i.e., that with which justice, in contradistinction to wisdom, courage, and temperance, is concerned—is the ground of all positive law; positive laws contradicting natural law are not valid.

It is sometimes asserted that the Stoics differ from Plato and Aristotle by being egalitarians. Differing from Aristotle (but not from Plato), they denied that there are slaves by nature; but this does not prove that according to them all men are by nature equal in the decisive respect, i.e., as regards the possibility of becoming wise or virtuous (Cicero, On the Ends of the Good and Bad Things iv, 56). The peculiarity of the Stoics, in contradistinction to Plato and Aristotle, that explains why the Stoics were the first philosophers to assert unambiguously the existence of natural law would seem to be the fact that they teach in a much less ambiguous way than Plato, to say nothing of Aristotle, the existence of a divine providence that supplies divine sanctions for the compliance or noncompliance with the requirements of virtue. (Cf. Cicero, Laws II, 15-17; Republic III, 33-34.)

The Stoic natural law teaching is the basic stratum of the natural law tradition. It affected Roman law to some extent. With important modifications it became an ingredient of the Christian doctrine.

Christian teaching

The Christian natural law teaching reached its theoretical perfection in the work of Thomas Aquinas [see Aquinas]. It goes without saying that in the Christian version, Stoic corporealism (“materialism”) is abandoned. While natural law retains its status as rational, it is treated within the context of Christian (revealed) theology. The precise context within which Thomas treats natural law is that of the principles of human action; these principles are intrinsic (the virtues or vices) or extrinsic; the extrinsic principle moving men toward the good is God, who instructs men by law and assists them by his grace. Natural law is clearly distinguished from the eternal law—God himself or the principle of his governance of all creatures —on the one hand, and the divine law, i.e., the positive law contained in the Bible, on the other. The eternal law is the ground of the natural law, and natural law must be supplemented by the divine law if man is to reach eternal felicity and if no evil is to remain unpunished. All creatures participate in the eternal law insofar as they possess, by virtue of divine providence, inclinations toward their proper acts and ends. Rational beings participate in divine providence in a more excellent manner because they can exercise some providence for themselves; they can know the ends toward which they are by nature inclined as good and direct themselves toward them. Man is by nature inclined toward a variety of ends which possess a natural order; they ascend from self-preservation and procreation via life in society toward knowledge of God. Natural law directs men’s action toward those ends by commands and prohibitions.

Differently stated, as a rational being man is by nature inclined toward acting according to reason; acting according to reason is acting virtuously; natural law prescribes, therefore, the acts of virtue. Man by nature possesses knowledge of the first principles of natural law, which are universally valid or unchangeable. Owing to the contingent character of human actions, however, those conclusions from the principles which are somewhat remote possess neither the evidence nor the universality of the principles themselves; this fact alone would require that natural law be supplemented by human law. A human law that disagrees with natural law does not have the force of law (Summa theologica I, 2, 90 ff.). All moral precepts of the Old Testament (as distinguished from its ceremonial and judicial precepts) can be reduced to the Decalogue; they belong to the natural law. This is true in the strictest sense of the precepts of the Second Table of the Decalogue, i.e., the seven commandments which order men’s relations among themselves (Exodus 20.12-17). The precepts in question are intelligible as self-evident even to the people and are at the same time valid without exception; compliance with them does not require the habit of virtue (Summa theologica I, 2, 100).

A sufficient sanction is supplied by divine punishment for transgressions of the natural law, but it is not entirely clear whether human reason can establish the fact of such punishment; Thomas surely rejects the Gnostic assertion that God does not punish and the assertion of certain Islamic Aristotelians that the only divine punishment is the loss of eternal felicity. He does say that sin is considered by the theologians chiefly insofar as it is an offense against God, whereas the moral philosophers consider sin chiefly insofar as it is opposed to reason. These thoughts could lead to the view of some later writers that natural law strictly understood is natural reason itself, i.e., natural law does not command and forbid but only “indicates”; natural law thus understood would be possible even if there were no God (cf. Suárez, Tractatus de legibus ac de Deo legislatore n, 6, sec. 3; Grotius,De jure belli ac pads, Prolegomena, sec. 11; Hobbes, Leviathan, chapter 15-end; Locke, Treatises of Civil Government n, sec. 6; Leibniz, Théodicée, sec. 183).

Thomas treats natural right (as distinguished from natural law) in his discussion of justice as a special virtue (Summa theologica n, 2, 57). Therein he is confronted with the task of reconciling with the Aristotelian teaching the Roman law distinction between ius naturale and ius gentium, according to which natural right deals only with things common to all animals (like procreation and the raising of offspring), whereas the ius gentium is particularly human. The Roman law distinction might seem to reflect early conventionalist teaching (cf. Democritus, fr. 278). Thomas’ reconciliation apparently paved the way for the conception of “the state of nature” as a status antedating human society. (Cf. Suárez, Tractatus II, 18, sec. 4.)

The Thomistic natural law teaching, which is the classic form of natural law teaching, was already contested in the Middle Ages on various grounds. According to Duns Scotus, only the commandment to love God—or, rather, the prohibition against hating God—belongs to natural law in the strictest sense. According to Marsilius of Padua, natural right as Aristotle meant it is that part of positive right which is recognized and observed everywhere (divine worship, honoring of parents, raising of offspring, etc.); it can only metaphorically be called natural right [See Marsilius of Padua]. The dictates of right reason regarding the things to be done (i.e., natural law in the Thomistic sense), on the other hand, are not as such universally valid because they are not universally known and observed.

Modern developments

Natural law acquired its greatest visible power in modern times: in both the American and the French revolutions, solemn state papers appealed to natural law. The change in effectiveness was connected with a substantive change; modern natural law differs essentially from premodern natural law. Premodern natural law continued to be powerful; but it was adapted to modern natural law, with varying degrees of awareness of what was involved in that adaptation. The most striking characteristics of modern natural law are these: (1) Natural law is treated independently, i.e., no longer in the context of theology or of positive law. Special chairs for natural law were established in some Protestant countries; treatises on natural law took on the form of codes of natural law. The independent treatment of natural law was made possible by the belief that natural law can be treated “geometrically,” i.e., that the conclusions possess the same certainty as the principles. (2) Natural law became more and more natural public law; Hobbes’s doctrine of sovereignty, Locke’s doctrine of “no taxation without representation,” and Rousseau’s doctrine of the general will are not simply political but legal doctrines. They belong to natural public law; they do not declare what the best political order is, which by its nature is not realizable except under very favorable conditions, but they state the conditions of legitimacy which obtain regardless of place and time. (3) Natural law by itself is supposed to be at home in the state of nature, i.e., a state antedating civil society. (4) In the modern development “natural law” is replaced by “the rights of man”; the emphasis shifts from man’s duties to his rights. (5) Whereas premodern natural law was on the whole “conservative,” modern natural law is essentially “revolutionary.” The radical difference between modern and premodern natural law appears most clearly if one studies the still remembered great modern natural law teachers rather than the university professors who as a rule rest satisfied with compromises.

The principles informing modern natural law were established by two thinkers who were not themselves natural law teachers, Machiavelli and Descartes. According to Machiavelli, the traditional political doctrines take their bearings by how men should live and thus culminate in the description of imaginary commonwealths (“Utopias”), which are useless in practice; one ought to start from how men do live. Descartes begins his revolution with the universal doubt, which leads to the discovery of the Ego and its “ideas” as the absolute basis of knowledge and to a mathematical-mechanical account of the universe as a mere object of man’s knowledge and exploitation.

Modern natural law as originated by Hobbes did not start, as traditional natural law did, from the hierarchic order of man’s natural ends, but rather from the lowest of those ends (self-preservation) that could be thought to be more effective than the higher ends [See Hobbes]. (A civil society ultimately based on nothing but the right of self preservation would not be Utopian.) Man is still asserted to be the rational animal, but his natural sociality is denied. Man is not by nature ordered toward society, but he orders himself toward it prompted by mere calculation. This view in itself is very old, but now it is animated by the concern for a natural-right basis of civil society. The desire for self-preservation has the character of a passion rather than of a natural inclination; the fact that it is the most powerful passion makes it the sufficient basis of all rights and duties. Natural law, which dictates men’s duties, is derived from the natural right of self-preservation. The right is absolute, while all duties are conditional. Since men are equal with regard to the desire for self-preservation as well as with regard to the power of killing others, all men are by nature equal. There is no natural hierarchy of men, so that the sovereign to whom all must submit for the sake of peace and ultimately of the self-preservation of each is understood as a “person,” i.e., as the representative or agent, of each; the primacy of the individual—of any individual—and of his natural right remain intact (cf. Leviathan, chapter 21).

The doctrine of Locke may be described as the peak of modern natural law [See Locke]. At first glance it appears to be a compromise between the traditional and the Hobbesian doctrines. Agreeing with Hobbes, Locke denies that the natural law is imprinted in the minds of men, that it can be known from the consent of mankind, and that it can be known from men’s natural inclination. His deduction of natural law is generally admitted to be confusing—not to say confused—which does not prove, however, that Locke himself was confused. It seems to be safest to understand his doctrine as a profound modification of the Hobbesian doctrine.

It is certain that, unlike Hobbes, Locke sees the crucially important consequence of the natural right of self-preservation in the natural right of property, i.e., of acquiring property, a natural right that within civil society becomes the natural right of unlimited acquisition. Property is rightfully acquired primarily by labor; in civil society, however, labor ceases to be the title to property while remaining the source of all value. Locke’s natural law doctrine is the original form of capitalist theory.

Rousseau too starts from the Hobbesian premise [See Rousseau]. Hobbes asserted that the natural right to judge the means of self-preservation is the necessary consequence of the right of self-preservation itself and belongs, as does the fundamental right, equally to all men, wise or foolish. But Rousseau demands that the natural right to judge the means of self-preservation be preserved as an institution within civil society. Every person subject to the laws must as a natural right have a say in the making of the laws by being a member of the sovereign, i.e., of the legislative assembly. The corrective to folly is to be found above all in the character of the laws in general, both in origin and in content: all subject to the laws determine what all must or may not do. The justice or rationality of the laws is thereby guaranteed in the only way compatible with the freedom and equality of all. In the society established in accordance with natural right, there is no longer a need or a possibility of appealing from positive law to natural right, because the members or rulers of that society are not supposed to be just men.

Rousseau further differed from Hobbes by realizing that if man is by nature asocial, he is by nature arational; questioning the traditional view that man is the rational animal, he found the peculiarity of man in his perfectibility or, more generally stated, his malleability. This led to the conclusions that the human race is what we wish to make it and that human nature cannot supply us with guidance as to how man and human society ought to be.

Kant drew the decisive conclusion from Rousseau’s epoch-making innovations: the Ought cannot be derived from the Is, from human nature; the moral law is neither a natural law nor a derivative of natural law [See Kant]. The criterion of the moral law is its form alone, the form of rationality, i.e., the form of universality.

At about the same time that Kant, sympathizing with the French Revolution, radicalized the most radical form of modern natural right and thus transformed natural right and natural law into a law and a right which are rational but no longer natural, Burke, opposing the French Revolution and its theoretical basis, which is a certain version of modern natural right, returned to premodern natural law [See Burke]. In doing so, he made thematic the conservatism which was implicit to some extent in premodern natural law. Therewith he profoundly modified the premodern teaching and prepared decisively the transition from the natural “rights of man” to the prescriptive “rights of Englishmen,” from natural law to “the historical school.”

Leo Strauss, "Natural Law.International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. 1968. Encyclopedia.com. 20 Feb. 2015, at http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/natural_law.aspx

In this explanation we can see the power, whether real or imagined, ascribed to natural law as the common law of all men, as the source for providing the minimum and maximum human conditions, in contradistinction to positive law which was established by societies in order to satisfy their own particular needs that may pertain only to that society. We can see how natural law evolved into that philosophy to be adopted by man to guarantee his or her “natural right of self-preservation.” 
  
With these principles of natural law in mind, let us now examine what birth circumstances make one a natural born citizen.  In other words, under natural law what means or mechanism makes one a natural born citizen?  The long-time settled definition of a natural born citizen, based on common or universal consent of nations, is a child born in a country to parents who were its citizens at the time of the child’s birth.  Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Section 211 to 217 (1758) (1797).  Vattel explains that the law of nations is the law of nature applied to the affairs of nations.  Under that law of nations, he defines the “citizens” as “the members of the civil society; bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to its authority, they equally participate in its advantages.”  Section 212.  He also explains that the virtue of love of country, which is necessary for the preservation, survival, and perpetuation of that country, is naturally given to our “native country” by its “natives, or natural-born citizens, [who] are those born in the country of parents who are citizens.”  Section 211 to 212.  (In Section 122, he also explains the duty that one has to defend one’s adopted country “with his utmost efforts.”) 

America had recently fought an independence war with Great Britain, which divided the loyalties of its own people.  So, the Framers knew firsthand how critical undivided loyalty and allegiance were to the future survival of their cause for liberty and the preservation of the new republic.  The Framers commanded that Presidents and Commanders of the Military born after the adoption of the Constitution be natural born citizens to assure that they would be born with those circumstances which would best assure that they would develop the virtue of love of country and thereby be free of monarchical and foreign influence in whatever form it may present itself.  The historical record demonstrates that, with the Office of President being a singular and all-powerful office both civilly and militarily, the Framers took extra measures to keep monarchical and foreign influence out of the Office of President.  Rather than relying upon Congress to elect the President, they gave that power to the Electoral College.  Unlike allowing “citizens” to serve in Congress, they required future Presidents to be “natural born citizens.”  They looked to the natural born citizen clause to assure that the President would in the future protect and preserve the constitutional Republic which they had built.  They sought to achieve this end by requiring that those future Presidents and Commanders be born with unity of citizenship and allegiance to the United States.  They looked upon the natural born citizen clause as a means to accomplish their end. 

Regardless of whether or not their value judgment is correct or how the modern world thinks about natural law, the Founding generation incorporated the universally binding natural law and law of nations definition of a natural born citizen into American common law and the Framers relied upon that common law when they drafted and adopted the Constitution.  Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 167-68 (1875) (“At common-law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives, or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners”); U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 708 (1898) (cited and quoted Minor’s definition of a natural born citizen and its source as coming from the common law and held that a child born in the United States to alien parents, who were neither foreign ambassadors nor military invaders, was under principles laid down by colonial English common law born subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and therefore a “citizen” of the United States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment [not to be confused with an Article II natural born citizen]).  As we can see from this definition, a natural born citizen is a citizen from the moment of birth by virtue of his or her birth (a citizen “by birth”) and nothing more, by the force of being born in the country of which both of his or her parents were member citizens at the time of his or her birth.  A natural born citizen needs no law in order to gain that status at birth, for he or she gains that birth status strictly by the circumstances of his or her birth, just like a natural or biological child of certain parents gains that status simply by being born to those parents as opposed to an adopted child of certain parents who gains that status by being adopted by those parents by the grace of a particular law.  As applied to the United States, a natural born citizen of the United States is a child born or reputed born in the United States to parents who were both U.S. citizens at the time of the child’s birth.   Having been incorporated into the Constitution, this definition of a natural born citizen is the law of the land until amended by constitutional amendment or re-interpreted by a U.S. Supreme Court decision.  

A simpler way to look at the meaning of an Article II natural born citizen is to consider that under the law of nations, only a child who was born in a country to parents who were citizens of that country were "true" natural born citizens. This law of nations definition was incorporated into American common law. 

All other citizens who may be so made "at birth" under the positive laws of a nation may be citizens "at birth," and even considered by some as natural born citizens, but they are not "true" natural born citizens. In this connection, consider the Naturalization Act of 1790 which said that children born out of the United States to U.S. citizen parents "shall be considered as natural born citizens," which the Naturalization Act of 1795 changed to "shall be considered as citizens of the United States." Notice how the First Congress said that those citizens "at birth" shall be considered as natural born citizens, but since they were not true natural born citizens, the Third Congress said that they shall be considered only as citizens of the United States. Consider further that with the Naturalization Act of 1802, as interpreted, Congress treated those same children (born out of the United States to U.S. citizen parents who in 1790 were considered as natural born citizens and in 1795 were considered as citizens of the United States “at birth”) as aliens and in need of naturalization after birth. Surely, if those same children were true natural born citizens, neither Congress nor those who interpreted its naturalization act would have conclude that they were aliens. 

In this same connection, today the Fourteenth Amendment and naturalization Acts of Congress make children born in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof “citizens” of the United States “at birth.” Other naturalization Acts of Congress make children born out of the United States to U.S. citizen parents also “citizens” of the United States “at birth.” Of these children, those who do not meet the original common law definition of a true natural born citizen, are “citizens” of the United States “at birth.” Some consider them to be natural born citizens, like the British, under colonial English common law and statutes, considered all children born as or made “subjects,” “natural-born subjects.” But they are not true natural born citizens under the more demanding and strict American common law and hence constitutional requirement. 

Since the Framers used the original American common law definition of a natural born citizen which came from the law of nations, which definition became incorporated into the Constitution as part of the supreme law of the land, only a "true" natural born citizen may be President and Commander in Chief of the Military. And that true natural born citizen is only that child who is born or reputed born in the United States to parents who were both U.S. citizens at the time of the child's birth. 

Senator Ted Cruz was not born in the country of which both his parents where citizens at the time of his birth.  He was born in Canada to a U.S. citizen mother and a non-U.S. citizen (Cuban) father.  He cannot be a natural born citizen of the United States because he was not born in the United States and also because he was born to a non-U.S. citizen father.  Rather, Senator Cruz’s birth circumstances qualify him under Canadian law to be a citizen at birth of Canada and under a naturalization Act of Congress as a “citizen” of the United States “at birth.”  He may also qualify as a citizen at birth under Cuban law through birth to a Cuban citizen.  These laws are positive internal or municipal laws of these nations and not universally binding upon nations as the natural law of nations. Under 8 U.S.C. 1401(g), a naturalization Act of Congress, Senator Ted Cruz is a “citizen” of the United States “at birth.”  He is made a citizen at birth not only by his birth circumstances, but rather because this naturalization Act of Congress makes him a citizen of the United States at birth.  Hence, he is a citizen only because Congress allows him to be one through one of its naturalization Acts of Congress, which it can change at any time it pleases.  (In the past, and specifically under the Naturalization Act of 1802, as interpreted, Congress has even denied altogether the status of a citizen of the United States to children born out of the United States to U.S. citizen parents.)  Additionally, the Constitution gives to Congress in matters of citizenship only the power to naturalize which does not include the power to make anyone a natural born citizen.  Congress has recognized this limitation on its power and therefor in its statute calls persons it is naturalizing from the moment of birth only “citizens” of the United States “at birth” and not natural born citizens of the United States. Consider that the First Congress in the Naturalization Act of 1790 said that children born out of the United States to U.S. citizen parents “shall be considered as natural born citizens” which the Third Congress changed in the Naturalization Act of 1795 to “shall be considered as citizens of the United States.”  Hence, at best under the very text of the statute, Senator Cruz is a “citizen” of the United States “at birth,” not a natural born citizen of the United States.  
  
Senator Ted Cruz is a “citizen” of the United States “at birth” by virtue of his birth circumstances and a naturalization act of Congress (a positive law), not by virtue of his birth circumstances alone.  At best, he is also a “citizen” of the United States “at birth” by the very text of the statute.  He is a “citizen” at birth of the United States, Canada, and maybe Cuba also.  But he is not an Article II natural born citizen which could not under U.S. law possibly allow one to be simultaneously a citizen at birth of other nations.  Renouncing his birthright Canadian citizenship as he has recently done does not nor can it retroactively change the birth circumstances with which he was born.   

Similarly, de facto President Barack Obama, was not born in the country of which both his parents where citizens at the time of his birth.  He was presumably born in the United States to a U.S. citizen mother, but to a non-U.S. citizen father (his father was a Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies (CUKC) under the British Nationality Act 1948 which converted to a citizen of Kenya upon Kenya’s independence from Great Britain in 1963).  Not being born to a U.S. citizen father, he does not satisfy the common law definition of a natural born citizen.  He is, however, presumably a “citizen” of the United States “at birth,” by virtue of his birth circumstances, and the Fourteenth Amendment or 8 U.S.C. Section 1401(a) (laws which provide that “[a]ll persons born . . . in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States. . . ”), not by virtue of his birth circumstances alone or some law that constitutionally declares textually that he is a natural born citizen.  He is therefore also not an Article II natural born citizen. 

So, what do Mr. Obama and Mr. Cruz have in common?  They are both not born with unity of citizenship and allegiance to the United States and therefore not Article II natural born citizens.    Being neither a “natural born Citizen, [n]or a “Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution,” neither Obama nor Cruz are constitutionally eligible under Article II to be President and Commander in Chief of the Military.
To review my examination of the numerous historical and legal sources that support my position on the meaning of a natural born citizen, see the many articles and comments that I have published at my blog, www.puzo1.blogspot.com
Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
February 20, 2015
http://puzo1.blogspot.com
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Copyright © 2015
Mario Apuzzo, Esq.

All Rights Reserved   

Wednesday, January 28, 2015

Rick Santorum Is An Article II Natural Born Citizen and Eligible to Be President









Rick Santorum Is An Article II Natural Born Citizen and Eligible to Be President

By Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
January 28, 2015


  










Rick Santorum will be a presidential candidate in 2016.  As we know, the President and Commander in Chief of the Military must be, among other things (at least 35 years old and a resident in the United States at least 14 years), an Article II “natural born Citizen” in order to be eligible for that Office.  There has been some chatter that Rick Santorum is not a natural born citizen and therefore not eligible to be President.  My research shows the contrary, i.e., that Rick Santorum is a natural born citizen and therefore eligible to be President and Commander in Chief of the Military. 

The one and only definition of a natural born citizen the Framers used when they adopted the Constitution is the universal one which is a child born in a country to parents who were its citizens at the time of the child's birth, meaning, when applied to the United States, a child born in the United States to parents who were both U.S. citizens at the time of the child's birth. See Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Section 212 (1758) (1797) ) (“The natives, or natural-born citizens, are those born in the country, of parents who are citizens”); Minor v. Happersett (1875) (“‘At common law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children, born in a country, of parents who were its citizens, became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives, or  [902]  natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners”); U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark (1898) (distinguished a "natural born citizen" as so originally defined by the common law at the time of the adoption of the Constitution per Minor from a "citizen" at birth under the Fourteenth Amendment which was ratified 81 years after the adoption of the Constitution).  Does Rick Santorum meet the Framers’ common law definition of an Article II natural born citizen”  My research shows that he does. 

Rick Santorum was born on May 10, 1958 in Virginia.  "Rick Santorum is the middle of the three children of Aldo Santorum (1923–2011), a clinical psychologist who immigrated to the United States at age seven from Riva del Garda, Italy, and Catherine (Dughi) Santorum (b. 1918), an administrative nurse who is of Italian and Irish ancestry.[8]  Santorum was born in Winchester, Virginia, and grew up in Berkeley County, West Virginia, and Butler County, Pennsylvania.”  (footnotes omitted). http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rick_Santorum . Aldo Santorum (Rick Santorum’s father, who was born on January 9, 1923 in Italy) was the son of Pietro Santorum (Rick Santorum’s grandfather).  Pietro, an Italian citizen, came to America on November 20, 1923, and naturalized to become a citizen of the United States on April 14, 1930.  See the research done by Commander Charles F. Kerchner at https://www.scribd.com/doc/86126538/Pietro-Santorum-Naturalization-Records-filed-1930-at-Somerset-County-PA-Courthouse  When Pietro became a citizen of the United States, Aldo was a minor and still living in Italy.  Aldo got derivative U.S. citizenship through his father, Pietro, when Aldo arrived in the United States on August 23, 1930 when he was age 7.  

Aldo Santorum automatically become a citizen on August 23, 1930 through the naturalization of his father which had already occurred on April 14, 1930.  This type of citizenship is called derivative citizenship.  But since he was neither born in the United States nor naturalized in the formal sense after his birth, he did not have any evidence that he was a U.S. citizen.  So, on April 17, 1961, he filed for a Certificate of Citizenship, not to obtain citizenship which he already had since 1930, but only to obtain evidence of that citizenship.  His application and related documents have also been obtained by Mr. Kerchner and can be viewed here: http://www.scribd.com/doc/108907280/100-Proof-Rick-Santorum-Born-a-Dual-Citizen-Not-a-Natural-Born-Citizen-Father-perfected-naturalization-3-yrs-after-Rick-was-born-FOIA-Response-R .  These documents show that Aldo served in the U.S. military from 1944 to 1946. The Immigration and Naturalization Officer who reviewed his application recommended that his Certificate of Citizenship be granted, concluding:

"[T]he applicant did derive or acquire United States citizenship on August 23, 1930 through on which date he was a lawful permanent resident of the United States and under the age of 21 years, his father having been naturalized on April 14, 1930, his mother being an alien. and that he has not been expatriated since that time."

Rick was not yet born when Pietro and Aldo became U.S. citizens in 1930.  Aldo married Catherine (Dughi) Santorum, who was a  U.S. citizen.   Hence, when Rick Santorum was born on May 10, 1958, to Aldo and Catherine, both his parents were U.S. citizens. 

We have seen that both de facto President Barack Obama and Senator Ted Cruz, both not born in the United States to parents who were both U.S. citizens at the time of their son’s birth, do not satisfy the constitutional common law definition of a natural born citizen.  See my many articles on this issue at my blog, http://puzo1.blogspot.com .  On the other hand, my research shows that when Rick Santorum was born in Virginia in 1958, he was born to a father and mother who were both citizens of the United States.  Those birth circumstances make Rick Santorum an Article II natural born citizen and eligible to be President and Commander in Chief of the Military.   

Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
January 28, 2015
http://puzo1.blogspot.com
####

Copyright © 2015
Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
All Rights Reserved